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DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST*
EDMUND M. MORGANI

"Declarations of a person, whether verbal or written, as to facts relevant
to the matter of inquiry, are admissible in evidence, even as between third
parties, where it appears: (1) That the declarant is dead; (2) that the
declaration was against his pecuniary or proprietary interest; (3) that he
had competent knowledge of the fact declared; (4) that he had no probable
motive to falsify the fact declared." This, Mr. Justice Walker of North
Carolina in 1906 stated to be the established rule.' What is its origin; for what
reason is the evidence held to be admissible; to what extent is the reason
controlling in the judicial decisions?
I. IN

ENGLAND

1. Declarations Against Pecuniary Interest
(1) Origin and Evolution.-Searle v. Lord Barrington2 has been said to
be "the fountain from which all other authorities on this question flow in one
uninterrupted channel." 3 In that case plaintiff sued in debt on a bond dated
June 24, 1697. Defendant relied upon the presumption of payment from the
lapse of more than twenty years. To rebut this presumption, plaintiff offered
in evidence two indorsements on the bond in the handwriting of the obligee,
dated respectively December 7, 1699, and March 25, 1707, each reciting the
receipt of interest to date. Pratt, C.J., sustained defendant's objection and
plaintiff suffered a nonsuit.4 Thereafter he brought another action, at the
trial of which Lord Raymond, presiding, received the indorsements in evidence.
On writ of error to the Exchequer Chamber from a judgment for the plain*The most thorough consideration of the authorities and most thoughtful examination of the rational basis of this exception to the hearsay rule is the article by Mr.
Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rule,
in 58 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1944). It is much more thought-provoking than Wigmore's
treatment of the subject. No one dealing with this subject can afford to overlook or
disregard it. Although I disagree with some of Mr. Jefferson's conclusions, I acknowledge
great indebtedness to him.
tFrank C. Rand Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Royall Professor of Law
Emeritus and former Acting Dean, Harvard Law School; Reporter, A.L.I. Model Code
of Evidence; author, numerous articles on Evidence and other subjects.
1. Smith v. Moore, 142 N.C. 277, 55 S.E. 275, 278, 7 L.R.A. (N.s.) 684 (1906).
2. 2 Str. 826, 93 Eng. Rep. 875 (K.B. 1725), aff'd, 3 B.P.C. 593, 1 Eng. Rep. 1518
(H.L. 1730). Other reports of the case are to be found in 2 Ld. Raym. 1370, 92 Eng.
Rep. 392 (K.B. 1724) and 8 Mod. 278, 88 Eng. Rep. 198 (K.B. 1725).
3. Gleadow v. Atkin, 1 Cr. & M. 410, 425, 149 Eng. Rep. 459, 465 (Ex. 1833).
4. On hearing a motion to take off the nonsuit, the majority of the judges were
of opinion that the evidence should have been admitted, but they held that the plaintiff
had put himself out of court by taking the nonsuit. It was later the settled practice to
remove the nonsuit and grant a new trial when the nonsuit was taken because of a
mistake of law by the judge. 2 Str. at 827.
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tiff, the case was twice argued before the judges of the Common Pleas and
of the Exchequer, and the judgment was affirmed. A writ of error was
brought in Parliament, where after consideration of the arguments of counsel
for the parties and of the opinions of the judges delivered seriatim, the judgment was affirmed in February 1730. Three judges were absent; of those
present, all but Baron Comyns were for affirmance.; Unfortunately there is
no report which sets forth either the opinions of the judges or the reasons
which induced Parliament to affirm. In none of the reports is any ground for
the decisions of the lower courts stated nor is the argument of counsel given.
The argument for plaintiff in Parliament stressed the protection afforded the
obligor by indorsements upon the bond itself as furnishing him evidence of
payments which in most instances he would not be able to prove otherwise,
and urged that if the indorsements were made on the dates specified in them,
their being written by the obligee could furnish no ground of objection, "because it was impossible that he could have any bias upon him, or be in any
manner influenced to make them, for they were evidence against him, and
he could derive no advantage from them, as he had no occasion to take off
the presumption of payment, there not being a lapse of 20 years, from the
day of payment to the date of the indorsements. ''6 When judicial disapproval
of this decision was asserted by counsel in Gleadow v. ,,Itkin,7 Bayley, B.,
replied that the only objection he had heard was that there was no extrinsic
evidence of the time when the indorsements were made and that although
the reports made no mention of it, he had by independent research discovered
that such evidence was in fact given.
In Manning v. Lechmere s Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in discussing
evidence to prove title in a lessor pointed out that receipts for rent are not
sufficient evidence, especially where the person signing the receipt is alive,
for he ought to be examined in the cause, but he added: "Where there are old
rentals, and bailiffs have admitted money received by them, these rentals are
evidence of the payment, because no other can be had.""
Three years later, in 1740, in Warren v. Greenville10 in the King's Bench
the issue was whether a client of Mr. Edwards, an attorney, had suffered a
recovery. The defendant offered in evidence an entry in a book of Edwards
of charges for suffering the recovery, for drawing the surrender and for
engrossing two parts of it, with a notation that the charges were paid. The
5. See 3 B.P.C. at 595n, 1 Eng. Rep. at 1520n. Baron Vaughan in Gleadow v.
Atkin, 1 Cr. & M. 410, 149 Eng. Rep. 459 (Ex. 1833), says the argument was before
eight judges "three of whom were thought to be dissentient." Id. at 426.
6. 3 B.P.C. at 595, 1 Eng. Rep. at 1519.
7. 1 Cr. & M. 410, 421, 425, 149 Eng. Rep. 459, 463, 465 (Ex. 1833).
8. 1 Atk. 453, 26 Eng. Rep. 288 (Ch. 1737).

9. Id. at 453.
10. 2 Str. 1129, 93 Eng. Rep. 1079 (K.B. 1740).
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court said in effect that there was no circumstance of suspicion, that if
Edwards were living he might have been examined and that "this was
now the next best evidence"'
The authority of this case was challenged by counsel in Higham v.
Ridgway," where the issue was the date of birth of Fowden Jr. As evidence
that he was born on April 22, 1768, and not on April 2, entries in the 'books
of a man-midwife, who was shown to have attended Mrs. Fowden, were
received. The entry in his daybook, wherein it was shown he made entries of
all matters relating to his business immediately upon his return home, was
under date of April 22, 1768, and recorded the birth to Mrs. Fowden of a
son, followed by a figure referring to a ledger page on which was an entry
of a charge for attendance on April 22 and for medicine on April 26, with
the notation "Pd. 25th. OcXtr, 1768." Lord Ellenborough insisted that
Warren v. Greenville was solid authority for admitting the entry and that
the ruling therein was made after thorough consideration. He said the
entries in the man-midwife's book were properly admitted
"upon the broad principle on which receivers' books have been admitted; namely,
that the entry was made in prejudice of the party making it. In the case of the
receiver, he charges himself to account for so much to his employer. In this case the
party repelled by his entry a claim which he would otherwise have had upon the other

for work performed, and medicines furnished to the wife .... If this entry had been
produced when the party was making a claim for his attendance, it would have been
evidence against him, that his claim was satisfied. It is idle to say that the word paid
only shall be admitted in evidence without the context, which explains to what it
refers: we must therefore look to the rest of the entry, to see what the demand was,
which he thereby admitted to be discharged."'

Grose, J., and LeBlanc, J., agreed that Warren v. Greenville was controlling. The latter remarked that "the entries were made by a person who,
so far from having any interest to make them, had an interest the other
way; and such entries against the interest of the party making them are
dearly, evidence of the fact stated, on the authority of the case of Warren v.
Greenville and all of those cases where the books of receivers have been
admitted."'13 Bayley, J., is reported a having concluded his opinion thus:
"But the principle to be drawn from all the cases, beginning with Warren v.
Greenville down to Roe v. Rawlings, is that if a person have peculiar means
of knowing a fact, and make a declaration of that fact, which is against his
interest, it is clearly evidence after his death, if he could have been examined
to it in his lifetime. And that principle has been constantly acted upon in the
14
case of receivers' accounts.
11. 10 East 109, 103 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B. 1808).
12. Id. at 117.
13. Id. at 121.

14. Id. at 122-23.
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In Gleadow v. Atkin' 5 the bond upon which the action was brought
bore an indorsement by the obligee, Gleadow, that the principal sun was
not his own proper money, but trust money under the will of the late Cuthbert
Thew. If this was true, a payment of interest to Mrs. Thew had the same
legal effect as if it had been made to the obligee. Evidence was received
that such a payment had been made to Mrs. Thew after the period had
elapsed when a presumption of payment would have arisen, and the case
turned on the admissibility of the indorsement. Pollock and Creswell took
the position that in Higham v. Ridgway and similar cases, as well as those
of receivers' accounts, the declarant, if alive, would have been a competent
witness in the case, but that here Gleadow would have been clearly incompetent. They relied upon the statement of Bayley, J., quoted above. The
court unanimously repudiated the limitation and put all the cases beginning
with the Searle case in the same class and rested them upon the ground that
the declarant had peculiar knowledge of the fact stated and had no motive to
misrepresent, and that the declaration was against his interest.
(2) Meaning of "Against Interest."--In these precedents we have the
origin of the rule in so far as it deals with declarations involving a pecuniary
interest. While in some of the opinions there is an intimation that only ai
absence of a motive to falsify should be required, certainly the later decisions
have insisted on more than that. But the language in which the requirement
is phrased is ambiguous. The declaration must be against the declarant's
interest. It is too obvious for comment that the courts do not mean that the
mere utterance of itself, whether oral or written, creates a disadvantageous
legal relation between the declarant and another. And Wigmore's assurance,
that "the question whether the statement of the fact could create a liability
is beside the mark,"'16 is not worth discussion. But his preceding sentences
assert that the fact stated must be against interest, and that it is for this
reason that declarant's "open and deliberate mention of it is likely to be
true." Why "open and deliberate"? If it is likely to be true, it is because he
believes it to be true. Would his belief not be the same if his statement was
not open and deliberate, but was contained in a secret document? Is the
underlying idea that a man will not concede even to himself the existence of
a fact which would create an unconditional obligation to do something to his
financial disadvantage unless he believes that it does exist, or is it that
he will not make a statement which he realizes can later be used as evidence
against him, unless he believes it to be true? Wigmore's text has usually
been interpreted as finding his "guaranty of trustworthiness" in the disserving quality of the fact stated rather than in the disadvantage to the
declarant which the making of the statement creates. If this interpretation
15. 1 Cr. & M. 410, 149 Eng. Rep. 459 (Ex. 1833).
16. 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1462 (3d ed. 1940) (italics in original).
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is correct, the inference which is to be drawn from the utterance to the
declarant's state of mind is based on the content of his utterance and not
on the circumstances in which it is made. If the proper interpretation requires in addition that the utterance be open and deliberate, his state of mind,
to be inferred, must include something more than his belief in the existence
of the fact stated-namely, his realization that the statement may be used
against him.
It will be observed that Lord Hardwicke's justification for the reception
of "old rentals" by bailiffs as evidence of payment was necessity, "because
no other can be had.' 7 The King's Bench in Warren v. Greenville noted that
the entry by Edwards could not be suspected to be done for the purpose of
use in an inquiry as to the reasonableness of the surrender, and was evidence
next best to that of testimony of Edwards, but Lord Ellenborough later put
the reception of this entry on the ground that it was made in prejudice of
the entrant. In Searle v. Lord Barrington, counsel's emphasis was upon the
use of the entry as evidence and the lack of motive to make it at the time it was
made. And in Barry v. Bebbington,'8 where the steward's entries were in his
private book, Ashhurst, J., took pains to say that the lord, if he had brought
action against the steward, "might have given him notice to produce the
books in which these entries were made." In various other cases it is pointed
out that the entry or declaration could have been used as evidence against
the party making it. In the Sussex Peerage Case'9 one of Lord Lyndhurst's
reasons for holding the testimony inadmissible was that the offered declarations were made to declarant's own son, "and in so making them, it cannot
be presumed that he would have exposed himself to prosecution, or that he
21
''
made them under any belief that he should do so. 20 In Massey v. Allen,

Vice Chancellor Hall interpreted Lord Blackburn's pronouncement 22 as imposing the requirement that the entry be one "which under no circumstances
could operate for the advantage or benefit of the party who made it."' 23 He

rejected an entry in a broker's book on the ground that it might, depending
on the turn of the market, prove to be to the advantage of the broker. And
Lord Moulton in Tucker v. Oldbury Urban Council24 said that the proponent
must show that the statement was, to the knowledge of the declarant, contrary
to his interest.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Manning v. Lechmere, 1 Atk. 453, 26 Eng. Rep. 288 (Ch. 1737).
4 T.R. 514, 516, 100 Eng. Rep. 1149, 1150 (K.B. 1792).
11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844).
Id. at 110.
13 Ch. D. 558 (1879).
In Smith v. Blakey, L.R. 2 Q.B. 326 (1867).
13 Ch. D. 558 at 563.
[1912] 2 K.B. 317, 321 (CA.).
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These precedents furnish ample ground for a conclusion that the English
courts placed primary emphasis upon the creation of available evidence
against the declarant rather than upon the disserving quality of the matter
declared. On the other hand, North, J., in Newbould v. Smith21 seems to
have considered the rule applicable to an entry in a private diary. And in
Ward v. H. S. Pitts Co. 2 6 the Court of Appeal reviewed all the cases and

laid down the following requisites of admissibility: (1) Declarant made
a statement of a fact of the truth of which he had peculiar knowledge. (2) The
fact was to declarant's immediate prejudice; that is, against his interest at
the time he stated it. (3) Declarant knew the fact to be against his interest
when he made the statement; "it is on the guarantee of truth based on a
man's conscious statement of a fact, 'even though it be to his own hindrance'
that the whole theory of admissibility depends." (4) The interest to which
the statement is adverse must be pecuniary or proprietary.
(3) The Stimulus to Treth-Telling.-In these first three requisites,
this authoritative resum6 of the English cases makes it reasonably clear
that so far as admissibility is concerned, declarant's consciousness that the
fact stated is against his interest is controlling, and there is no necessity
that he realize that the statement may be used as evidence against him in
the future. And this seems plain common sense. No one can doubt that
when a person acknowledges that he must account to another for a sum of
money whether because he has collected it for the other or because he owes
it to the other for some other reason, he believes in the truth of the acknowledgement whether he communicates it to another or not. Obviously if after
a dispute has arisen, he then made acknowledgment openly and deliberately,
he would ordinarily have been aware that he was furnishing evidence against
himself. Where the statement is written upon a document or in a book which
the writer must have known would be used by another in determining the
existence or extent of obligation between them, it is reasonable to infer that
the writer realized that he was furnishing the other with information upon
which the other would rely, and this would make the writer careful not to
concede anything detrimental to his financial interest. Thus, in the Searle
and Gleadow cases the indorsement upon the document and in rentals cases
where the entries were in books kept by the bailiff or steward in the course
of his employment as bailiff, the fact that the statement would be usable
against the writer might well have been in his mind and have furnished a
real stimulus to write only the truth. But except in such situations what must
25. 29 Ch. D. 882 (1885). He held the entry inadmissible as not against interest.

26. [1913] 2 K.B. 130, 137, 138 (C.A.). In this case the court approved the test

laid down in Smith v. Blakey, L.R. 2 Q.B. 326 (1867), as opposed to that used by the
distinguished Jessel, M.R., in Taylor v. Witham, 3 Ch. D. 605 (1876), "so far as there
is any real difference between them. .. "
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be assumed as the state of mind of a person who is conscious that he is
making evidence against himself when he says that he owes X a hundred
dollars? Certainly he is conscious that the fact stated imposes an obligation to
pay. But if he thinks of his statement as creating evidence against himself,
must he also not be thinking of denying or repudiating the obligation, for
there will never be any occasion to use the statement against him unless he
does deny or repudiate it? And if he intends to do that, is it at all likely
that he would make the statement, unless it be assumed that he fears his
own dishonesty and wants to erect' a bulwark against temptation? Except
in most extraordinary circumstances the very fact that the declarant makes
the statement renders it most unlikely that he is contemplating its use as
evidence against himself.
Now consider the situations of which that in Higham v. Ridgway is
typical. A person to whom a debt was due declares that it has been paid in
full. He repels a claim which he otherwise would have had, as Lord Ellenborough put it. True, but does he believe that the fact stated is against his
interest? Since when does a physician consider a charge on his books more
advantageous than cash in hand? If a merchant collects an account from
a delinquent debtor, does he believe the collection to be to his pecuniary
damage? By what sort of legal legerdemain does what every creditor considers a benefit become so transformed as to be, to the knowledge of the
creditor, against his pecuniary interest? Well, it prevents him from collecting
it again. Consequently, by his acknowledgment of payment, he is making
evidence against himself. But it is not the fact that the declaration may
be used as evidence against him that furnishes the guaranty of truth; what
is required is his realization that he is creating the damaging evidence.
Again, how can he have any such thought unless he contemplates an attempt
to collect twice? And if he were so unscrupulous as to contemplate such a
course, what likelihood is there that he would have made the entry?
Whether a statement of a fact which destroys a previously existing
valid claim is against interest depends upon the fact. If the fact destroys the
claim without conferring a corresponding benefit upon the declarant, it is
obviously contrary to his interest, as, for example, where his claim has been
discharged by the bankruptcy of the obligor or has become barred by lapse
of time. But when he exchanges the claim for a benefit which any reasonable
man would consider more desirable than the claim, the exchange is in no
sense disserving, and it is little short of nonsense to assume that he realized
either that the exchange was contrary to his pecuniary interest or that there
was any likelihood that his statement would be used or usable as evidence
against him in the future. It must not be forgotten that the supposed guaranty
against falsehood is his state of mind at the time of making the statement.

458
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The bare fact that he has lost a valid claim, without more, is obviously
against his interest. Consequently the statement that lie has lost it coupled
with the statement that he has gained an equal or greater benefit in return
may be regarded as a statement of a combination of damaging and beneficial
facts. If he had received the benefit at the same time that he suffered the loss
but not in exchange for the loss, it would be clear that his statement of the
loss would meet the requirement, for in making it the disserving fact would
have been in his consciousness. And there would be no reason for excluding
evidence of his statement as tending to prove the loss. Even if the benefit were
in exchange for the loss, it might not be unreasonable to argue that he would
have in mind the injurious effect of the loss as offsetting to some extent the
benefit; and if the statement were to be received as evidence tending to prove
the loss and nothing more, no great deviation from the theory on which the
exception is said to be grounded would be involved. But except where what
was received in exchange for cancellation of the claim was pecuniarily less
desirable than the claim, the exchange either was beneficial or it created
neither benefit nor loss; and there is no justification in the reason of the
rule for receiving evidence of the claimant's statement as tending to prove
anything other than the loss. Nor can there be any reasonable contention
that the exchange or the statement concerning it was preponderatingly
against the interest of the declarant.
If it be granted that the statement of payment in full of a conceded or
proved claim has a sufficiently disserving quality to justify its classification
as a declaration against interest, what of such a statement concerning a claim
supported by no evidence extrinsic of the statement, as in Warren v. Greenville? The orthodox argument for that decision is that the acknowledgement
of receipt of payment is by itself disserving, and that it carries with it the
self-serving assertion of the facts creating the claim. But on this theory the
acknowledgment can be disserving only on the assumption of the existence
of the claim, which is the very fact the evidence is offered to prove. If this
isn't question-begging, it comes perilously close to it.
It was probably for this reason that Mr. Justice Littledale in Doe v.
Vowles 27 refused to receive evidence of an entry marked paid as tending to
prove performance of the services charged in the entry. But in Rex v. Iihabitaints of Lower Heyford,28 Baron Parke in 1840 held the contrary. And
in Taylor v. Witham"2 9 the distinguished Master of the Rolls, Sir George
Jessel, said that he preferred to follow the view of Baron Parke. In that case
Taylor, the residuary legatee of his brother, was claiming that the sum of
27. 1 Moo. & Rob. 261, 174 Eng. Rep. 89 (N.P. 1833).
28. 2 Smith L. C. 371 (1840) (8th Am. ed. 1885).
29. 3 Ch. D. 605 (1876).
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12000, which Witham had received from the testator in December 1871, was
a loan; Witham was asserting that it was a gift by way of a marriage
portion to Taylor's niece, whom Taylor had married shortly before. Witham
had used the money to purchase a house in which Taylor afterward resided
with Witham and his wife. To overcome Witham's evidence that the money
was a gift and not a loan, Taylor offered in evidence entries in a private
account book of Witham. The first, dated October 1, 1872, recited a payment
of 120 interest by Witham. The others, on a separate page, began with the
date, January 1872, and a recital that J. Witham acknowledged "lone" of
£2000. This was followed by four entries, each of receipt of interest of £20,
one of them obviously a repetition of the previously mentioned entry of
October 1, 1872. A fifth entry under the same date as that of the last
interest payment was "Paid off £20. Left £1980."
In two striking particulars these facts differ from those in the Greenville
and Heyford cases. First, these entries asserted receipt of only partial payment of the claim. As a whole they are highly self-serving; and the evidence
is offered to prove the existence and amount of the unpaid balance. In the
previous cases the offered evidence was an assertion or set of assertions which
as a whole was neither self-serving nor disserving. In an action by the
entrant against the person charged to recover the amount of the claim, it
would not have been relevant or admissible for the entrant but would have
been receivable against him. Second, in the previous cases the parties were
entire strangers to the entrant. In the Taylor case the plaintiff, as successor
in interest to the entrant, stood in his shoes and was relying on his selfserving statements. Jessel held the entries admissible. He made no pretense
that either the fact stated or the making of the statement was against the
entrant's interest. If the entry by itself is prima facie against his interest, he
said, it is admissible. All that is necessary is that "the natural meaning of the
entry standing alone" be "against the interest of the man who made it."30
"Of course, if you can prove aliunde that the man had a particular
reason for making it, and that it was for his interest, you may destroy the
value of the evidence altogether, but the question of admissibility is not a
question of value."'
He did not mention Smith v. Blakey3 2 or Lord Blackburn's pronouncement therein, which explained that the reason for admitting disserving entries
is that they could never be made available for the entrant himself. Indeed,
Jessel made the rule a mere rule of thumb, and thereby repudiated every
reason that had been advanced for excepting such declarations from the
30. Id. at 607.
31. Ibid.
32. L.R. 2 Q.B. 326 (1867).
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operation of the hearsay rule, for even the most liberal theories had required
a lack of motive to misrepresent. But it has been approved by English text
writers and has been accepted in some latter decisions. 3a It was disapproved
by the Court of Appeal in the Ward case.
2. DeclarationsAgainst ProprietaryInterest
The precedents dealing with declarations against proprietary interest
are no more satisfactory than those concerning declarations against pecuniary
interest. The earliest decisions admitting declarations of an occupier of land
have nothing to say about the availability of the declarant or the disserving
quality of his utterance. In Holloway v. Rakes34 and Doe v. Williams 5 the
declaration of a tenant that he was the tenant of a named person was received
as tending to prove that person's title, though in the latter case the available
declarant was not permitted to testify for his landlord. These cases were
cited and followed in Davies v. Pierce30 in 1787, where the declarant's
statement was that he had paid rent to a specified person. Eight years later
in Walker v. Broadstock37 the proponent offered evidence that a tenant of a
messuage had said that he had no right of common appurtenant to the messuage as tending to prove the truth of the fact stated. To an objection on the
ground of hearsay, the court replied that it was not hearsay, but opinion of
the tenant and the best evidence of opinion, and that declarations of occupiers are evidence against their own rights. In Doe v. Rickarbyas a statement by an available witness that she was a tenant of defendant was held
admissible, and nothing was said about its being against interest.
In 1808, the year in which Higham v. Ridgway39 was decided, Doe 71.
Jones40 and Ivat v. Finch4x came before the courts. In the former, Lord Ellen33. See Ward v. H. S. Pitts Co., [1913] 2 K.B. 130 (C.A.). The Court of Appeal
preferred the view of Lord Blackburn to that of Jessel, M.R., "so far as there is any
real difference between them. . . ." Id. at 137. It is difficult to understand this qualification, for their views seem as far apart as the East is from the West. Notwithstanding the
disapproval of this doctrine by the Court of Appeal in the Ward case, the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia in McDonald v. Young, 7 M.R.P. 602, 4 D.L.R. 172 (1934) held
similar entries admissible, Ross, J., remarking that it seemed somewhat anomalous to
admit entries that on the whole were self-serving and referring to Ganton v. Size, 22
U.C.Q.B. 473, 483 (1863), where the judge pointed out that the entry was "by mere
pecuniary computation twenty-five times more in his favor than it is against him."
See note 52, infra, and BAKER, THE HEARSAY RULE 71-72 (1950).
34. Decided in 1769, cited and applied in Davies v. Pierce, 2 T.R. 53, 100 Eng. Rep.
30 (K.B. 1787).
35. 2 Cowp. 621, 98 Eng. Rep. 1273 (K.B. 1777).

36. 2 T.R. 53, 100 Eng. Rep. 30 (K.B. 1787).
37. 1 Esp. 458, 170 Eng. Rep. 419 (N.P. 1795).

38. 5 Esp. 4, 170 Eng. Rep. 718 (C.P. 1803). The declarant was unavailable.
39. 10 East 109, 103 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B. 1808), supra, note 11.
40. 1 Camp. 367, 170 Eng. Rep. 988 (N.P. 1808). (The statement was clearly a
vicarious admission.)
41. 1 Taunt. 141, 127 Eng. Rep. 785 (C.P. 1808).
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borough, who sat also in Highan v. Ridgway, held admissible a memorandum
signed by one Byron, a former owner of a copyhold, that a garden was not
part of the copyhold and that he had paid rent for it. He pointed out that
Byron's interest was the other way and that he charged himself by this
representation with payment of rent for which he would not have been
liable if the garden had been part of the copyhold. In the latter a woman,
since deceased, had said that she had retired from business and transferred
all her property to another. Evidence of this statement was held admissible
by Sir James Mansfield, who said that the "admission" was against the
declarant's interest, that if the action had been against her the evidence would
have been clearly admissible, and that it ought to have been received against
the plaintiff since his right depended upon her title.
Possession of realty, so it is generally held, is prima facie evidence, or
raises a presumption that the possessor is seised ifh fee simple. On this
basis the court in Peaceable v. Watson 42 held that the declaration of a posses-

sor that he was tenant of another made most strongly against his interest
and was admissible in evidence in favor of the other as the real plaintiff in an
action of ejectment against a defendant who was not claiming through the
declarant. In none of the earlier cases is the disserving quality of the declaration so explained. In Carne v. Nicoll,43 counsel argued that although any
declaration by an occupier showing that he had less than a freehold was
admissible as an admission or to rebut adverse possession, it could not be
received to prove title in another. But Tindal, C.J., was not persuaded, and
followed Peaceable v. Watson. Baron de Bode's Case44 in 1845 and Doe v.
Langfeld45 in 1847 applied the same reasoning without enlightening comment. It remained for Queen v. Overseers of Birmingham4 and Queen v.
Governors and Guardians of Exeter47 to disclose the full sweep of the rule.
Each was a pauper settlement case. In the former, the issue was whether one
Day, since deceased, shown to be the occupier of certain premises, had paid
a sufficient amount of rent to establish a settlement in Kingswood. It was conceded that he had paid some rent; and it was agreed that the order of removal of the pauper should be quashed if evidence was admissible that
Day had said that he was tenant at ;20 a year. During the course of the
argument, Blackburn, J., asked counsel why the statement might not have
been self-serving, for the rent might have been 130. He did not reject the
specious reply, that fraud is never presumed. The court held the evidence
42. 4 Taunt. 16, 128 Eng. Rep. 232 (C.P. 1811).
43. 1 Bing N.C. 430, 131 Eng. Rep. 1183 (C.P. 1835).

44. 8 Q.B. 208, 243, 115 Eng. Rep. 854, 868 (K.B. 1845).
45. 16 M. & W. 497, 153 Eng. Rep. 1285 (Ex. 1847).
46. 1 B. & S. 763, 121 Eng. Rep. 897 (Q.B. 1861).
47. L.R. 4 Q.B. 341 (1869).
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admissible. Both Cockburn, C.J., and Blackburn reasoned that the declaration was against interest because of the presumption of seisin in fee. Once
the evidence was admitted, the principle established in Higham v. Ridgway
made it usable to prove the amount. They pointed out that in Peaceable v.
Watson the admission of the declarant that he was a tenant was usable to
prove him tenant to AB. In the Exeter case on the issue whether James
McGuire had acquired a settlement in Welsford, all pertinent facts were
conceded except his payment of rent. The case turned on the admissibility of
(1) entries in his handwriting in a book reciting two payments of rent
and (2) his oral statement to his daughter that he had rented the house
from James Brook at 122 a year and had paid the rent. The objection made
to the application of the former decisions was that they had received the
evidence only as tending to show to whom the rent was paid and the amount.
The court, however, interpreted the Birmingham case as making the doctrine
of Higham v. Ridgway controlling as to declarations against proprietary interest, and said that "it would be most objectionable to lay any narrow restrictions upon the reception of declarations . . . against interest .

.

. by per-

sons since deceased .... ",48 "It would be absurd to hold that a declaration
was admissible, but to hold that it was no evidence as to one of the main
facts which it imported.1

49

These two cases and Ivat v. Finch ° were cited in the Ward case," and
the reason on which they were based was stated, apparantly with approval and
certainly without disapproval by the Court of Appeal. What possible foundation in fact is there for the presumption that an occupant of a house realizes
that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law regards him as
owner in fee simple, or that when he asserts that he has a lease for a year,
he is stating a fact against his proprietary interest? Even if this suggestion
does not pass the boundary of the probable, what extraordinary combination
of unusual conditions would be required to cause the ordinary renter to
regard as a disadvantage to him the fact that he had paid his rent?
2
The climax of absurdity is reached in In re Adans.6 Testatrix, who lived

with her husband in a house owned by her, died in June 1919. She had made
a will in 1907. Her executor found an empty envelope with an indorsement
stating that it contained the will. The husband confessed that he had
destroyed the will. It was conceded that without the will he had no interest
in the realty and that under the will he took a life estate. He was in possession
of the premises after his wife's death until his death in January 1920. In a
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 345.
Id. at 344.
1 Taunt. 141, 127 Eng. Rep. 785 (C.P. 1808).
[1913] 2 K.B. 130 (C.A.).
[1922] P. 240.
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proceeding to establish the will, in which the heirs put the proponent to the
proof, Horridge, J., held the declaration of the husband, then deceased,
admissible. He did not pretend that the husband knew of his presumed ownership in fee simple or that he had any notion that a will which gave him a
life estate operated against his proprietary interest. He interpreted the
Exeter case as establishing the rule that "any statement which is prima facie
against the interest of the speaker is admissible even if, when the facts are
examined, it may not turn out to be detrimental." 53
Can it be that in England a declaration which standing alone is prima
facie against pecuniary interest is not admissible if it appears in truth to be
neutral or self-serving, as the Court of Appeal said in the Ward case, but
that a declaration prima facie against proprietary interest is always admissible? Is that the effect of the failure of the Court of Appeal to disapprove
the Exeter case? Or are the text-writers and the judges who accept the
doctrine of Baron Parke and Jessel, M.R., to be trusted rather than Blackburn, J., and the Court of Appeal ?
3. DeclarationsAgainst Penal Interest
Whatever the answer to these queries, nothing can make the English
authorities have even a superficial appearance of rational consistency so long'
as the currently accepted interpretation of the Sussex Peerage Case5 5 prevails;
namely, that evidence of a declaration against penal interest is inadmissible
in a situation where a similar declaration against pecuniary or proprietary
interest is receivable. The law lords unanimously rejected the proffered
evidence of a declaration of a clergyman that he had performed a marriage
forbidden by statute; Lord Brougham, Lord Denman, and Lord Campbell
agreed that -the declaration, to be admissible, must be against pecuniary or
proprietary interest. Lord Campbell added: "I think it would lead to the
most inconvenient consequences, both to individuals and to the public; if
we were to say that the apprehension of a criminal prosecution was an
interest which ought to let in such declarations in evidence. . . ."56 Lord

Chancellor Lyndhurst thought that the circumstances in which the statement was made negatived any realization by the declarant that he was
exposing himself to prosecution, and Lord Campbell, pointed out, apparently
as a makeweight, that there was nothing to indicate the declarant's state of
mind. It seems idle to argue that the opinion of the Lord Chancellor and this
53. Id. at 242. But here as in Taylor v. Witham, the result is sensible. The husband
conceded that he had been guilty of very disgraceful, if not criminal, conduct.
t4. See BAKER, TE HEARSAY RULE 71-72 (1950).
55. 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844).
56. Id. at 113, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045,
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remark of Lord Campbell throw any appreciable doubt upon the interpretation of the decision that has been accepted for over a century. And Mr.
Wigmore's optimistic statement, "In England the limitation would perhaps
nowadays no longer be observed" 57 has precious little foundation. In the case
which he cites,5" the trial judge told defendant's counsel that he might put
in, anonymous letters containing confessions of crime, saying: "I quite agree
that the letter is strictly inadmissible; but under all the circumstances it
might be done."
The English decisions are hopelessly confusing. They purport to have
a foundation in reason for creating an exception to the hearsay rule. In some
situations that reason. is a guide, to decision. In others where the reason
obviously exists, it has no operative effect. In still others where it does not
exist, .it is treated as if it were present and controlling.

II.

IN THE UNITED STATES

1. Declarations Against Pecuniary Interest
The American cases also leave much to be desired. As to declarations
against pecuniary interest, there seems never to have been ,any, doubt that a
declaration, acknowledging indebtedness to another or the recepit of money
for which the declarant must account to another, falls within the rule. The
early opinions rely heavily upon the English. precedents beginning with
Searle v. Lord Barrington and Warren v. Greenville. The text-writers agree
that the doctrine of the latter case as expounded and applied in Higtain v.
Ridgway is generally accepied. 59 And the decisions support them where
the proponent of the evidence is one other than the entrant or his successor
in interest. Thus in Knapp v. St. Louis Transit Co.,"0 evidence of entries
in the account book of a deceased physician of charges, marked paid, against
a patient for attending her for a specified ailment was received as tending to
prove the nature of the disease for which he treated her. And in MaassecFelton Lumber Co. v. Sirmans,61 the return of a sheriff of a sale of certain
real estate, reciting his receipt of the purchase price, was received in evidence
as tending to prove the truth of his statements therein as to his authorization
to make the sale.
57. 5 W ORE, EVIDENCE § 1476 and note 10 thereto (3d ed, 1940).
58. William Gardiner's Trial (1902), Notable British Trial Series 145, 208 (1934).

The case is discussed in 5

WIGMdoRE, EVIDENCE 288, n.10.
59. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1465 (3d ed. 1940) ; 4 CHAMDERLAYNE, MODERN LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 2788 (1913) ; 3 JONES, COM-MENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN

§ 1169 (2d ed. 1926).
60. 199 Mo. 640, 98 S.W. 70 (1906).
61. 122 Ga. 297, 50 S.E. 92 (1905).

CIVIL CASES
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. But no case has been found which goes so far as to hold that an entry
acknowledging part payment of a contested claim is receivable in evidence
as a declaration against the entrant's interest when offered by him or his
successor in interest as tending to prove the truth of the facts asserted as the
basis of the claim. And none has been found which accepts Jessel's notion that
the test of admissibility is not whether the statement when made was
actually disserving but whether, taking it at face value, standing alone, and
without regard to the circumstances in which it was made, its natural meaning was against interest.
Wigmore disapproves the English doctrine which holds inadmissible
that the declarant is a promisor in an executory bilateral constatement
a
2
tract. He says "The incurring of a contract liability of any sort is on
principle a fact against interest." 0 3 It should go without saying tlat a man
will not ordinarily enter into a contract which he believes to' be to "tiis
pecuniary disadvantage. Consequently it seems difficult to support Wigmore's
thesis, particularly since he suggests that the test should be "that the interest
injured or the burden imposed 1y the fact stated should be one so palpable
and positive that it would naturally have been present in the declarant's
mind."0 4 The cases which he cites to support his position are not in point.
For example, White & Elder v. Chouteau65 concerned a declaration of
receipt of money accompanied with a statement indicating its source and the
terms on which it was received; and its admissibility was justified by citation
0
of Higham v. Ridgway. And Hosford v. Hosford held admissible a declaration of revocation of a contract which -the declarant had obviously considered
to his pecuniary or proprietary advantage. Mr. Jefferson. thinks Wigmore
cannot properly consider a statement of the existence of an executory contract to be against interest when by its terms it is obviously beneficial to the
declarant, so long as Wigmore stands on the proposition that the fact
stated must be against interest. But he believes that the American authorities
accept Wigmore's view without any attempt to explain it. The decisions
upon which he relies, however, as he concedes, though using the language
of declarations against interest, may be explained as dealing only with
62. Queen v. Worth, 4 Q.B. 132, 114 Eng. Rep. 847 (Q.B. 1843). The proponent

argued that by the entry by the promisor in his private book, the declarant was making
evidence against himself.
63. 5 WIGmoRE, EvmE:CE § 1461, p. 269 (3d ed. 1940).

64. Id. at 267.
65. 10 Barb. 202, 209 (N.Y. 1850). Tully, since deceased, said he had got the
money and accepted defendant's offer on plaintiff's guaranteeing the sale. The issue was
whether plaintiffs, who were brokers for Tully, had guaranteed the sale so as to make
it proper for them to sue the buyer in their own names.
66. 41 Minn. 245, 42 N.W. 1018 (1889). The elderly declarant husband's statement
was that he had -destroyed an antenuptial agreement which limited his much younger
wife's interest in his estate to one-seventh and that he wanted her to have the greater
part of his property.
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vicarious admissions of a predecessor in interest.0 7 Indeed, on any other
theory, some of them are obviously wrong, for the evidence received included
declarations that could not possibly have been considered disserving and
would doubtless have been rejected if offered by declarant's successor in
interest and not against him. In other cases the alleged contract had been
partially or fully performed, and most of these also obviously involved
vicarious admissions.0 " In such situations neither court nor counsel is compelled to distinguish between admissions and declarations against interest;
the confusing phrase "admission against interest" is used, and cases dealing
with vicarious admissions and declarations against proprietary interest are
cited without discrimination. 9 Since the pertinent opinions do not declare
that the legal relation created by a wholly executory bilateral contract is a
fact against interest within the rule, and the decisions are readily explainable
either on the ground that the statement received was a vicarious admission
or in the circumstances was of a fact against interest because of partial or
complete performance by the promisee, it can hardly be said that the'
American cases agree with Wigmore. Obviously cases admitting evidence of
statements conceding a breach of contract by the declarant do not support
him. If a stray case may be found here and there unqualifiedly applying his
dictum, it is out of harmony with the usual attitude of the courts.
What of an assertion of a fact which would create a valid claim against
declarant for damages in tort or would prevent the, creation of such a claim
in his favor? An admission of embezzlement of money or of the conversion
of a chattel would clearly constitute a declaration against pecuniary or
proprietary interest. In some other situations the fact stated is such that
any reasonable person must realize its pecuniarily disserving quality. For
example, where the declarant drives an automobile into collision with another's person or property and concedes that he was to blame because he did
not have the car under control or his attention was diverted from his driving
67. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay Rules
58 HARv. L. REv. 1, 28, n.59 (1944).
68. See, e.g., Steinberger v. Young, 175 Cal. 81, 165 Pac. 432 (1917); Jackson v.

Johnson, 126 Miss. 26, 88 So. 410 (1921) ; Lowell v. Wheeler's Estate, 95 Vt. 113, 112

Atl. 361 (1921) ; Lackey v. Price, 142 Va. 789, 128 S.E. 268 (1925).
69. There is much confusion of thought and language in the authorities dealing with

admissions, both personal and vicarious, and Wigmore has done little to clarify either, if
indeed he has not created greater perplexity. On personal admissions, see Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE L.J. 355 (1921) ; ef. 4 WiGMORm,
EvIDENcE, §§ 1048, 1049 (3d ed. 1940) (contrast first and second editions, third edition
same as second). On vicarious admissions, see Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REv. 461 (1929); ef. 4 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1062a-87, particularly 1080a, refuting 42 HARv. L. REv. 461 et seq. See 5 WIGM-oRE, EvIDENCE § 1459,
distinguishing an admission by a predecessor in title from a declaration against interest:
"Here [declaration of predecessor] the main requirements are that the admitter must
have had title at the time, and that the admission shall be used only against himself or

his successors; but the admitter need not be deceased before the statement can be used.
Here, too, no hearsay exception is involved."
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by conversation with a passenger, he would be extraordinarily naive or
stupid if he did not realize that he would be called upon to pay for such
damage as he had caused the other and would have no claim for any loss
he might have suffered. It is likely that in so clear a case most American
courts would admit evidence of such a statement as a declaration against
pecuniary interest. Indeed, in a growing number of instances they are receiving such evidence where the content of the statement and the circumstance
in which it was uttered make it very unlikely that the declarant was at the
time conscious either that the fact stated harmed his pecuniary interest or
that in stating it, he was creating evidence that might be used to his pecuniary
disadvantage."0 The test of admissibility should be his state of mind. If he
realizes the pecuniary disadvantage which is created by the fact stated, it
should make no difference that its amount is unliquidated or that the legal
consequences of it are to be given effect in an action of tort rather than of
contract. This, of course, is not to say that his knowledge of the availability
or unavailability of a means to make the fact hurt him pecuniarily is immaterial. If he knows that he is so situated that neither the fact stated nor
his making of the statement can do him pecuniary harm, it would be fatuous
to suppose that he was consciously influenced one way or the other by
financial considerations. Thus if a convict, without assets and condemned
to death, should confess that he either purposely or negligently injured
another or even that he owed another a large sum of money, it might well
be urged that he would have no motive to falsify or that he wbuld not be
likely to make such a statement of fault or delinquency if untrue, but it
would approach the ridiculous to argue that he would have in mind any
actual or potential financial harm to himself.7 1
On the other hand, assume that the declarant realizes that although he
cannot be personally harmed by the fact stated, it necessarily will result in
harm to his family as his successors in interest or that it creates a claim
enforceable against his estate or prevents the creation of a claim in favor
of his dependents who will survive him. If in a dying declaration a man
declares that the injury to his person was due solely to his own fault, or that
a claim appearing on his books as due and unpaid has been paid in full,
does his statement fall within the rule? Certainly his motive for protecting
his family or his dependents from financial harm would ordinarily be quite as
strong as that for protecting himself. In most instances the evidence would
be offered against his successor in interest and would be receivable as a
70. See, e.g., Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 378, 151 N.W. 852

(1915) ; Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142 (1945) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Straunch, 179 Okla. 617, 67 P.2d 452 (1937) ; Dillenberg v. Carroll, 49 N.W.2d 444
(Wis. 1951) ; Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rochinski, 158 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1946). But see
4 CHA;IDERLAYXE, MODERN LAW OF EVIDENicE § 2780 (1913), and cases cited.

71. See Newton v. State, 61 Okla. Cr. 237, 71 P.2d 122 (1937).
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vicarious admission, so that the applicability of the present exception would
be moot. In most of the actions for wrongful death, even under a statute like
Lord Campbell's Act, the courts find sufficient privity between the decedent
and the surviving beneficiaries to designate them his successors in interest.
In a few jurisdictions, the wrongful death act is said to give the survivor a
totally new action and to prevent the applicability of the vicarious admission
doctrine. In these there is a conflict as to whether a declaration of fault by
72
the decedent is admissible as a declaration against interest.
2. DeclarationsAgainst ProprietaryInterest
As to declarations against proprietary interest, Wigmore says:
"A statement predicating of oneself a limited interest instead of a complete litle to
property asserts a fact decidedly against one's interest, and has always been so regarded.
In particular, assertions that one's estate is a leasehold, not a freehold, or that one's
possession is merely as agent or as trustee for another, are admissible. [Quotation from
R. v. BirminghamP omitted.] Such statements may be used in so far as they tend to
prove the matter against interest, for example, that some other person is the owner
of the higher estate. But they could not be received to prove the matter as to which
they were not against interest-for example, the ownership of the limited estate
asserted."'

It may be significant that while he quotes from the Birmingham case,
he does not even cite the Exeter case7" or the Adams case,7 6 in both of which
the evidence was offered for a highly self-serving purpose; namely, to
prove in the former the payment of the rent and in the latter the existence
of a will creating a life estate in the declarant. It is true that the evidence
in each case was not offered in favor of the declarant, for neither he nor
anyone claiming through him was a party to the action. But the sole ground
of admissibility was the disserving quality of the declaration. Perhaps the
quotation means that any part of the statement bearing upon the matter
against interest, including amount and payment of rent, may be received,
but nothing tending to prove the fact or extent of the declarant's interest.
Wigmore also finds a "unique application of the principle" in Allegheny v.
Nelson,77 where the proponent offered in evidence the application of his
predecessor in interest for a grant of certain premises as an island. The
court pointed out that it was against the interest of the applicant to expend
his time and money in taking a title to the land as an island if it were not an
72. Carr v. Duncan, 90 Cal. App.2d 282, 202 P.2d 855 (1949)

thorities. Cases are collected in Note, 114 A.L.R. 921 (1938).
73. 1 B. & S. 763, 121 Eng. Rep. 897 (Q.B. 1861).
74. 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1458 (3d ed. 1940).
75. L.R. 4 Q.B. 341 (1869).
76. [1922] P. 240.
77. 25 Pa. 332, 334 (1855).

reviews the au-
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island. It therefore admitted the application as evidence that the land was
an island. It is too plain for argument that the statement when made was
highly self-serving, the fact stated was the very foundation of the applicant's
right and the evidence was received for the truth of the matter stated. The
decision seems in truth to be a unique misapplication of the principle.
But Wigmore's text, it is believed, does fairly state the result of the
American cases, although they cite the English decisions with apparent
approval. In few, if any, of them has the declaratiorn been received to prove
the asserted ownership of the lesser estate; in most of them it has .been
admitted only as evidence of the disserving fact or a neutral fact closely
connected with it, and in some of these it was obviously an admission by a
predecessor in interest. There is no doubt that here as elsewhere, the
opinions, encyclopedias and digests badly confuse declarations against interest
and vicarious admissions. On the whole the courts use the same approach
to declarations against proprietary interest as to declarations against
pecuniary interests. They do not indulge in fantastic deductions from the
mere fact of possession or other appareht interest in property. They seem to
feel free to inquire into the conditions under which the offered statement
was made, for what seems on its face to be against interest may in fact
appear to the declarant to be favorable to him and thus destroy his motive
to tell the truth. Roe v. JourneganS is one of the few cases where the
opinion goes into detail. There a recorded deed, in which declarant's father
was grantor, purported to convey a life estate in a parcel of land to declarant
with remainder to declarant's children. Decision of the issue depended
upon
whether declarant had accepted the deed. To overcome the presumption of
acceptance, proponent offered evidence of a statement, made several years
after the date of the recording, that he had no land and that his father had
offered to give him a place, but he wouldn't accept it. The court held this
inadmissible because the conditions under which the statement was made
indicated that declarant believed acceptance of the deed to be to his disadvantage. Yentis v. Mills7 presents a similar situation. A statement by 0,
the record owner, that the realty in question was owned by A was obviously
against his proprietary interest; but A had made a contract in the name and
as agent of 0 to convey the property to P and had received a cash payment
for 0 for which 0 would be liable to P if the conveyance were not made.
The court considered that this liability prevented the statement from having
the necessary disserving quality.
78. 175 N.C. 261, 95 S.E. 495 (1918)

(contains full discussion of the theory of

declarations against interests). Of course unless the declarant knew of the recorded

deed, he could not have been conscious of the disserving quality of his declaration.

79. 299 Pa. 25, 148 At. 909 (1930). See also Hollis v. Sales, 103 Ga. 75, 29 S.E.
482 (1897). It vill be noticed that this decision is in effect contrary to that in the
Exeter case, note 47, supra.
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In neither of these cases did the statement itself have any self-serving
quality. Had there been no evidence of the circumstances which overcame
the apparent stimulus to truth-telling, it would have been clearly admissible.
In each case the court based the rejection on the ground that declarant had
a motive to falsify. And the absence of a motive to falsify is in a number of
opinions said to be a necessary element of admissibility. Wigmore insists
that this is not a separate or additional requisites ° Mr. Jefferson disagrees."'
If we accept the theory that the exception is grounded on the assumption
either that a person will not concede even to himself the existence of a fact
which is against his interest or that he will not create evidence of the
existence of such a fact, it is difficult to see why Wigmore is not right. The
controlling element is the state of mind of the declarant. As a Minnesota trial
judge put it: "I cannot avoid the conclusion that the question must be
settled by the motives which would be presumed to actuate a declarant at the
time the statements were made." 82 If the declarant had a motive to falsify,
it might or might not neutralize or destroy the influence of the disserving fact
as a stimulus to truth telling, depending upon the strength of the motive.
3. Declarationswith Disserving and Self-serving Aspects
Where extrinsic circumstances disclose a motive to falsify, the controlling considerations should be no different from those which operate
where the disclosure is contained in the statement itself. Courts are constantly confronted with evidence of declarations which contain an assertion,
express or implicit, which standing by itself is so obviously against interest
as to be unquestionably admissible, and one which by itself would be rejected as self-serving or otherwise objectionable as hearsay. The self-serving
or otherwise objectionable matter, while a material part of the statement,
may or may not be clearly separable. As already noted, where a declarant
acknowledges full or partial payment of an unproved claim, as for goods sold,
his statement incorporates the assertion of the sale, so that as a whole it is
either neutral or self-serving. Where he states that he has received payment
of a proved claim for services rendered, described in detail, the identity of
the claim, so far as proved, is an inseparable part of the disserving statement; but, so far as not proved, may be easily separated. Thus in the Knapp
case, the extrinsic evidence may have shown that the physician attended
80. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1464 (3d ed. 1940).
81. Jefferson, DeclarationsAgainst Interest, 58 HARv. L. REv. 1, 52-57, citing cases.
82. Paine v. Crane, 112 Minn. 439, 128 N.W. 574, 575 (1910). In an action to determine
adverse claims defendant was claiming through his brother, he offered a declaration by
him that he had a deed from plaintiff but on plaintiff's advice had not recorded it, for
if it were put on record a judgment of $500 against declarant would be collected out
of the land. The trial judge excluded the declaration and the supreme court affirmed
his ruling.
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the patient but would not have shown the nature of her illness, and the
assertion of that was clearly separable and was unnecessary to identify the
claim. Where the creditor declares that he has received part payment of a
proved claim, his statement of receipt cannot be separated, but it has both
a self-serving and a disserving aspect. Insofar as it destroys his claim, it
is disserving; insofar as it opens a new period of limitations, it is selfserving. In any event the statement has a guaranty of trustworthiness only
insofar as the truth-telling stimulus of the declarant is operative. It would be
entirely unprofitable to seek a rational basis in the English decisions dealing
with such a situation so long as Taylor v. Withams3 is rec6gnized as an
authority. Wigmore asserts and some American decisions agree that the
whole statement should be examined to determine whether the matter against
interest outweighs that which favors the declarant. If so, evidence of the
statement is to be received as tending to prove its truth; otherwise, it is
to be rejected. If the statement is preponderatingly self-serving, it has nothing
to give credibility to its self-serving or neutral portions, and the credibility
which would normally be accorded its disserving portion is vitiated by the
motive of the declarant to falsify. If the statement is neutral and the evidence
is offered to prove either its self-serving or its neutral portion, there is
nothing to bring it within the reason for the exception, but if offered to prove
only the disserving portion, it may have as much inherent credibility as if
that portion stood alone. For example, if a taxpayer's return states his income at an amount which subjects him to any taxi the statement may be
true or false; he has a motive to put the amount at as small a figure as,
possible, but he has no motive to put it at any amount in excess of his
actual receipts. Why should not evidence of the return be received as tending
to show that his income was at least as large as the amount stated ?s
If the statement 'is preponderatingly disserving, and the evidence is
offered to prove the disserving matter, there is obviously no argument for
its rejection; if offered to prove the neutral matter, if any, itshould fall
within the exception unless that matter is so connected with or affected by
the self-serving portion as to be an integral part of it. But what if offered
to prove the self-serving portion? Wigmore's proposition seems to consider
the statement as a unit: it is either admissible as a whole or not at all.8 5
The cases which admit acknowledgment of payment in full of a claim for
goods sold, money lent or services rendered as evidence of the sale, loan or
83. 3 Ch. D. 605 (1876).
84. In Veach's Adm'r v. Louisville & I. Ry., 190 Ky. 678, 228. S.W. 35 (1921),
(1921), the court entirely overlooked the fact that the statement iithe
tax return in question was offered solely to prove the disserving fact, and there was no
extrinsic evidence tending to show a motive to falsify.
85. 5 WIGIAORE, EVIDENCE § 1464 (3d ed. 1940); BAKER, THE HEARSAY RULE
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rendition of services upon an issue between strangers f6 the transaction .support this theory. And in one situation' it has been unqualifiedly applied in
the earliest and most modern cases. Evidence of a statement of receipt of
part payment of a proved or admitted debt, offered by the declarant's successor in interest to prove the commencement of a new period of limitations,
has been received if made within the original, period and excluded if made
thereafter. s 6 But as already observed, evidence of a declaration by a possessor
of property of a limited interest therein is not admitted in favor of declarant's
successor to prove ownership of the interest. And, speaking generally, where
the evidence is offered by declarant's successor in interest to prove the selfserving matter, the American courts are inclined to reject it. It is in such
situations that they are especially likely to confuse vicarious admissions and
declarations against interest, and to point ouf that the evidence would be
admissible against the proponent but because of its self-serving features, is
inadmissible in his favor.s This is particularly true where the self-serving
matter is separable.
Perhaps it would not be unfair to say that Allen *v. Dillard8s illustrates
the usual attitude of the courts. In that case the action was for specific performance of a promise by Dr. Johnson to leave all her property by will to
plaintiff in consideration of a promise by Dr. Trtue to leave one halfof his
property to Dr. Johnson and one half to plaintiff. It was conceded that both
alleged promisors had executed on the*same day wlls'drawn by the same
attorney and witnessed by the same witnesses, leaving their respective
properties as in the alleged promises provided; that Dr. True did not change
his will and that the plaintiff and Dr. Johnson received property as provided
in his will. Dr. Johnson about five years after Dr. True's death revoked her
will and executed another. The issue was whether the original wills were
executed pursuant to contract formed by the alleged promises. Plaintiff offered to have Oliver True testify that Dr. True had told him (a) that he
and Dr. Johnson had agreed to leave their property as provided in the
original wills, of which he gave Oliver copies, and (b) that he wanted Oliver
to see that the terms of those wills were carried out according to the
agreement. The trial judge rejected this evidence, and the supreme court
affirmed. The opinion first questions Wigmore's view that the incurring of any
86. Searle v. Lord Barrington, 2 Str. 826, 93 Eng. Rep. 875 (K.B. 1725) supra,
note 2; Turner v. Crisp, 2 Str. 827, 93 Eng. Rep. 876 (K.B. 1740) ; cases collected in
Note, 59 A.L.R. 903 (1929). The statements received in the reported cases all seem
to have been made a reasonable time before the statutory period expired, so that the
motive to extend the period must have had but slight influence, if any.
87. I have been able to find no case which analyzed the situation as one in which
the whole statement was deemed preponderatingly against interest and an offered assertion deemed highly self-serving was admitted:
88. 15 Wash.2d 35, 129 P.2d 813 (1942). But see Dillenberg v. Carroll, 49 N.W.2d
444 (Wis. 1951), where the court cites loose generalizations without analysis.
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contractual liability is a fact against interest. Then it asserts that it might
be argued that a contract to make a will does not limit the pecuniary or
proprietary interest of the promisor. Next it confuses the exception for
declarations against interest with that for vicarious admissions. It then
suggests that extrinsic circumstances may make self-serving a statement
which is prima facie disserving, and it finally declares that a statement against
interest coupled with one that is self-serving is inadmissible if offered to
9
prove the facts beneficial to the declarant. Its citation of Cryer v. McGuire
and its interpretation of Hollis v. Sales 0 clearly indicate that it treats the
self-serving portion of the declaration, when evidence of it is offered by the
declarant's successor in interest, as it would treat a vicarious admission. At
any rate, it uses reasoning applicable to such an admission.
The truth is that the decisions dealing with declarations which commingle self-serving and disserving assertions are in no less confusion, and
are no less inconsistent, than those dealing with other aspects of the
exception. 91
4. DeclarationsAgainst Penal Interest
The doctrine of the Sussex Peerage Case92 seems to have been accepted
without question by the American courts until the early 1900's. The first
famous judicial challenge to its validity was in the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Holmes in Donnelly v. United States:9 3 "The confession of Joe Dick,
since'deceased, that he committed the murder for which the plaintiff in error
was tried, coupled with circumstances pointing to its truth, would have a
very strong tendency to make anyone outside of a court of justice believe
that Donnelly did not commit the crime." The Court of Criminal Appeal of
Texas, which was apparently not handicapped by knowledge of the Sussex
Peerage Case, had anticipated Mr. Justice Holmes by more than a decade,
89. 148 Ky. 100, 146 S.W. 402 (1912).
90. 103 Ga. 75, 29 S.E. 482 (1897).
91. A recent extreme example of this confusion is found in Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Bowen, 192 Va. 162, 63 S.E.2d 804 (1951). After discussing the requisites of
declarations against interest with reference to the statements of the unavailable driver
of the automobile in which plaintiff was riding when it collided with defendant's train,
the court concluded: "Whether mere absence from the jurisdiction be treated as the
necessary degree of unavailability or not, (which we need not and do not decide), and
though it be conceded that the statements were against Sheffield's pecuniary interest,
he was not a party to the cause, and they were not admissible against defendant in

error to exonerate the company." 63 S.E.2d at 810.

But rarely does a judge exhibit the utter confusion found in Maletis v. United
States, 97 F. Supp. 562 (D. Ore. 1951), in which testimony by plaintiffs as to their
mental condition was spoken of as self-serving declarations but admissible because
"admissions against interest."
92. 11 Cl. & Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844).

93. 228 U.S. 243, 277, 33 Sup. Ct. 449, 57 L. Ed. 820 (1913).
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in Blocker v. State.9 4 But when the case was reprinted in American State
Reports, the editor, in ignorance of a series of then recent Texas precedents,
interpreted the decision as modifying the orthodox rule only where the
evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial. And the Texas
court later preferred to follow this unenlightened commentator rather than
its own wiser predecessors.9 5 In 1926 the Virginia court adopted the view of
Mr. Justice Holmes with some reservations,"0 but it has recently come out
four-square for the admission of declarations against penal interest.97 The
Maryland court has been somewhat more cautious.98 Minnesota seems also to
favor the unorthodox rule,99 and Missouri has recently clearly and definitely
adopted it.10°
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Newton v. State'01 preferred to
adhere to the orthodox doctrine and refused to consider a statement admitting
a bank robbery as a declaration against pecuniary interest. It discussed only
the declarant's dying declaration that he had robbed a bank. Obviously one
who believes himself dying has no fear of being punished criminally so that
no fault can be found with the rejection of this statement as one against
penal interest. The declarant's financial condition was probably such that
he could hardly be regarded as having been influenced by the pecuniary
aspect of the situation. But the case also involved a statement made earlier
by the declarant, who, when questioned about money in his possession, said
that he had secured it by robbing the bank, the name of which was on the
bands binding the banknotes. The court treated this declaration as involving
no different questions. But in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Strauch'0 2 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court had before it a confession by the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy that he had procured the insurance for the assured with the intent to
murder her and that he had murdered her. This statement he made while
he was charged with her murder. The court refused to admit it as a declaration against penal interest but held it receivable as a declaration against
declarant's pecuniary interest in the policy. And in Weber v. Chicago R.I.
& P.Ry.,' 03 the Iowa court, while declining to rule on the admissibility of
94. 55 Tex. Cr. 30, 114 S.W. 814, 131 Am. St. Rep. 772 (1908).
95. See Morgan, DeclarationsAgainst Interest in Texas, 10 TEx. L. REv. 399, 409-16
(1932).
96. Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843, 35 A.L.R. 431 (1923).
97. Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 318 (1950).
98. Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 Atl. 148, 48 A.L.R. 342 (1926) ; Thomas v.
State, 186 Md. 446, 47 A.2d 43, 167 AL.R. 390 (1946).
99. See State v. Voges, 197 Minn. 85, 266 N.W. 265 (1936), 21 MINN. L. REv, 181;
In re Forsythe's Estate, 221 Minn. 303, 22 NAV.2d 19, n.3 (1946).

100. Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284, 162 A.L.R. 437 (1945).
101. 61 Okla. Cr. 237, 71 P.2d 122 (1937).
102. 179 Okla. 617, 67 P.2d 452 (1937).
103. 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852, L.R.A. 1918A 626 (1915).
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declarations against penal interest, held admissible as a declaration against
pecuniary interest a confession by declarant that he had purposely wrecked a
railway train. If this sort of reasoning were applied to all statements against
penal interest, the orthodox rule could do little harm, for almost every crime
against the person or property of another creates a liability in tort. Of course
it is more than doubtful that the person confessing the commission of a crime
has in mind, or is appreciably influenced by, considerations of liability for
damages. But the existence of the liability in tort furnishes a plausible ground
of escape from the results of a settled foolish rule. Since in a criminal
prosecution a defendant need raise only a reasonable doubt and such a
statement by an unavailable witness may be easily fabricated, it may well be
wise to require, as a condition of its admissibility, that there be some other
evidence tending to show declarant's guilt.
No case has been found which even intimates that a declaration of a
fact which would subject the declarant to hatred, ridicule, contempt or
social ostracism falls within the exception. But it requires no argument to
convince that the realization of such a consequence is generally a much more
powerful influence upon conduct than the realization of legal respbnsibility
for a sum of money.
III.

UNAVAILABILITY

OF DECLARANT

Evidence of a declaration against interest is inadmissible unless the
declarant is unavailable. Theoretically the cause of unavaliability should be
immaterial, and there is a strong argument for not requiring unavailability,
for a declaration carrying the guaranty of a really disserving statement is
quite as likely to be true as testimony given after controversy has arisen,
and if the declarant is available, he may be brought in for cross-examination.
But the English courts have been especially strict and have refused to
recognize any cause except death of the declarant. 0 4 The American cases
put insanity in the same category as death but are generally hesitant about
going further. 10 5 There are, however, some modern decisions showing a more
liberal and rational attitude. 10 6 This is particularly true where a declaration
against penal interest is admissible. In Harrison v. State'0 7 and Thomas v.
State'0s the declarant was present and testified. In Sutter v. Easterly'0 9 the
104. See BAKER, THE HEARSAY RULE 70 (1950).
105. See Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.y. 852 (1915);
Tom Love Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 166 Tenn. 275, 61 S.W.2d 672 (1933).
106. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Rochinski, 158 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
107. 47 Tex. Cr. 393, 83 S.W. 699 (1904).
108. 186 lid. 446, 47 A.2d 430, 167 A.L.R. 390 (1946). Compare the statement of
Mr. Justice Holmes as to a declaration by a predecessor in interest in Fourth Rational
Bank v. Albaugh, 188 U.S. 734, 736, 23 Sup. Ct. 450, 47 L. Ed. 673 (1903) : "If ever a
declaration not made under oath is 'to be admitted against any other than the person
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declarant was present but claimed his privilege against self-incrimination.
It is to be hoped that these cases indicate a general trend toward treating as
sufficient any actual impossibility of securing declarant's personal presence
which is not caused by the neglect or wrongaoing of the proponent. 10
IV.

NEED FOR LEGISLATION

The reason upon which this exception to the hearsay rule is said to
rest has a strong appeal. Men do not concede the existence of facts which
will cause them substantial harm unless they believe that those facts do exist.
But rarely in the application of a rule of law can be found such a conglomeration of inconsistencies, such flat contradictions in the facts of the very basis
of the rule declared to be applied. It is utterly useless to attempt to harmonize
the decisions or even to understand the intellectual processes of the writers
of many of the opinions. The need for intelligent legislation is clearly indicated. What of the proposal of the American Law Institute?
Rule 509 of the Model Code of Evidence provides:
"(1) A declaration is against the interest of a declarant if the judge finds that

the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time of the declaration so far contrary
to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest or so far subjected him to civil
or criminal liability or so far rendered invalid a claim by him against another or created
such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule or social disapproval in the
community that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration
'unless he believed it to be true.
"(2) Subject to Rule 505, evidence of so much of a hearsay declaration is admissible as consists of a declaration against interest and such additional parts thereof,
including matter incorporated by reference, as the judge finds to be so closely connected with the declaration against interest as to be equally trustworthy."'"

1. The theory on which the rule rests is that a person will not concede
even to himself the existence of a fact which will cause him substantial harm,
unless he believes that the fact does exist. Whether he realized that in making
the statement he was creating evidence against himself is immaterial upon
th question of admissibility, however pertinent it may be in determining the
persuasive value of the declaration.
-2. The disserving quality of the fact must be so apparent and important
that a reasonable man in the position of the declarant would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true. The state of mind of the
making it, it should be admitted in this case. The declaration was obviously against
interest. It was the only evidence in the nature of things that could be had, when
Martindale haltingly denied the fact on the stand."
109. 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284, 162 A.L.R. 437 (1945).
'110. See Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay
Ride, 58 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5-8; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1456 (3d ed. 1940).
111. MODEL CODE OF EvIDENcE, Rule 509 (1942). (Rule 505 deals with confessions.)
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declarant, his belief in the truth of fh statement, is decisive. That state of
mind is determined by an objective standard, that of a reasonable man in
the position of the declarant. In the absence of unusual circumstances, the
only reasonable inference is that the declarant's mental condition with reference to the subject of the declaration was that of a normal person. Evidence
of an unusual situation, as in Roe v. Journegan"2 and Paine v. Crane," 3 is to
be used to show not an unreasonable belief, but a belief reasonable in the
peculiar circumstances.
a. It is possible that a case may arise where a declarant honestly but
unreasonably believed the fact stated to be strongly against his interest when in
truth it was -highly advantageous. On theory, the declaration should be
received; under the rule it would be rejected; and tpractical considerations
!-"
seem to furnish a sufficient justification for this result. - '
b. It is also possible that a declarant may be shown to have considered
the fact 'stated; which was obviously against 'interest under the rule, to be
to: his advantage, even though the circumstances were such that the. belief
w\vs.tqtally unreasonable., On theory the decla'ration should be rejected; under
the. rule it would be received. Here, again, the situation is so unlikely to
occur that for ll practical purposes it may be disregarded. But if the hearsay
rule is to be preserved and declarations against interest are to-be put on a
rational 'basis, the test should be the actual state of'mind of the declarant
and pfrnigraph (1) of the rule might well have concluded "that the declarant
would not. have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true." Even
so, it would be futile to argue that the statement of 'a' self-serving fact should
under this exception be received merely because the declarant hbrestly believed the fact to be against his interest.
3. The rule makes clear that the facts having the necessary disserving
quality include (1) those which subject the declarant to (a) civil liability
(b) criminal liability (c) serious social disapproval, and (2) those which
render invalid a claim by declarant against another.
It does not, however, define pecuniary or proprietary interest. This is
perhaps unfortunate, for it apparently accepts the confused and confusing
interpretations that the courts have given to these terms in situations other
than those specified in the rule. It may be that the confusion would be
mitigated by the requirement that the declaration be such that a reasonable
man would not have made it unless he believed it to be true. It is suggested,
however, that any proposed legislation should confine this exception to statements that really carry the theoretical guaranty; and that other provision
112. 175 N.C. 261, 95 S.E. 495 (1918).
113. 112 Minn. 439, 128 N.W. 574 (1910), supra, uote 82.
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be made for the reception of other entries and declarations which reasonable
men treat as trustworthy.
4. The rule attempts to furnish a rational test for the reception of
neutral or self-serving matter which forms a part of a declaration against
interest. Obviously such parts of the statement as are found by the judge to
have characteristics of credit equal to those of the strictly disserving part
should be received. The circumstance that the matter was physically incorporated in the statement should not be controlling.
5. The rule does not require the declarant to be unavailable.
On the whole the proposed rule would greatly improve the existing
law. If an act dealing only with this exception is to be drawn, it should make
114
more precise definitions of the terms pecuniary and proprietary interest.
114. The Tennessee cases are generally in accord with the orthodox rule.
(1) Overton v. Hardin, 46 Tenn. 375 (1869) dealt with statements made by a
predecessor in interest (a) while he had the interest and (b) after he had transferred
it to his successor. The court noted the distinction and held (a) admissible as a vicarious
admission and (b) admissible as a declaration against pecuniary interest. The fact
against interest in the maker's declaration that an indorser was an accommodation indorser
was the liability of the maker for costs to the indorser if he were sued and lost after
reasonably contesting liability. It is extremely doubtful that tie maker realized the
disserving quality of his statement.
(2) In Tom Love Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 166 Tenn. 275, 61 S.W.2d 672
(1933), the trial judge was reversed for admitting a confession by a burglar, who had
become incompetent by conviction of the burglary, that he had burglarized plaintiff's
store. The question considered was whether the unavailability of the declarant on
account of infamy was sufficient'to satisfy the requirement of necessity. The court said
that only death or insanity would suffice. It stated the usual rule limiting the
interest to pecuniary or proprietary interest.
(3) Adcock v. Simon, 2 Tenn. App. 617 (M.S. 1926), talks of the admitted statement as being disserving, but it was admissible as a vicarious admission. The court
cited Overton v. Hardin.
(4) Nichol v. Ridley, 13 Tenn. 63, 26 Am. Dec. 254 (1833) admitted an oral
statement acknowledging receipt of payment by a judgment creditor.

